Liberman's 2018 Draft Law Sets New Floor for Haredi Conscription Talks
The proposal targets yeshiva funding rather than individual students, a shift that may influence upcoming coalition negotiations.
By Abigail Brooks ·
Six thousand two hundred and eight recruits. That is the number of ultra-Orthodox men the 2018 draft law proposed for military service by 2025. The figure has returned to the center of political debate as Avigdor Liberman signaled on Sunday that he is open to compromising with religious parties. His willingness to negotiate comes as Gadi Eisenkot prepares to receive the mandate to form a government.
The 2018 proposal, developed by the Defense Ministry and the Israel Defense Forces during Liberman’s tenure, differs sharply from the 2025 draft promoted by Boaz Bismuth. While both frameworks allow for service deferrals, they rely on different enforcement tools. Liberman’s bill focuses on institutional funding, whereas Bismuth’s legislation introduces personal restrictions on individual students.
Under the 2018 framework, yeshiva students could defer service until age 24. Bismuth’s proposal raises that age to 26. The older exemption age in Bismuth’s bill effectively extends the period of non-service for religious students. Liberman’s bill, by contrast, keeps the exemption window shorter but attaches a stricter expiration clause to the entire legal arrangement.
The most consequential provision in Liberman’s draft involves the survival of the exemption system itself. If actual enlistment falls below 85% of the annual target for three consecutive years, the law expires after a 12-month transition period. This creates a deadline that forces compliance or ends the special status. Bismuth’s proposal lacks this automatic termination mechanism, relying instead on review processes and financial adjustments.
Enforcement in the 2018 plan targets the institutions. Yeshivas face financial penalties if they fail to meet recruitment quotas. The committee that drafted the law also recommended expanding administrative sanctions against deserters. In Bismuth’s framework, individual students face restrictions on overseas travel, driver’s licenses, and government benefits. Some of these penalties trigger only after an enlistment order is ignored or if broader targets are missed.
Recruitment targets also differ in structure. Liberman’s bill set a baseline of 3,996 recruits in 2018, rising to 6,208 by 2025. Bismuth’s version set a target of 8,160 recruits over 18 months, an average of 5,440 per year. However, Bismuth’s bill allows up to 10% of the quota to be met by civilians in security roles, a category not present in the 2018 text. This distinction means the two figures do not represent identical commitments to new soldiers.
The political stakes are high as Eisenkot seeks to build a coalition. Liberman stated that his willingness to compromise does not mean abandoning his values. He noted that the 2018 law requires updates following the October 7 attacks, which increased the military’s manpower needs. The Bank of Israel has warned that current recruitment targets may not guarantee a sufficient number of new soldiers.
Liberman has not yet released an updated version of his bill. He has not specified which provisions are nonnegotiable. The haredi parties opposed the 2018 legislation because they viewed the budgetary sanctions and expiration mechanism as threats to the yeshiva world. The current debate centers on whether Liberman will demand changes to his original framework and whether religious parties will accept them.
